Gas and coal have long tied Japan to Australia. It’s time for a new climate and green industry partnership

Gas and coal have long tied Japan to Australia. It’s time for a new climate and green industry partnership

There was much warmth on display at the official leaders’ meeting between Australia and Japan on Monday. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese gave his Japanese counterpart Senae Takaichi an AC/DC drum skin signed by the band members, while receiving new vinyl records for his DJ collection. Both leaders famously love rock music.

But there was also national business at stake. The pair signed a joint declaration on economic security, outlining a broad agenda to align policies across trade, energy and critical minerals and new technologies such as quantum computing.

It’s not all been smooth sailing. Japan has been vocal in speaking out against proposals for higher taxes on Australia’s gas exports, and over domestic climate policies. To overcome this turbulence, a long-term vision for the Australia-Japan energy relationship is needed in a decarbonising world.

There are three distinct ways in which Japan and Australia’s interests are intertwined: how we tax companies that extract our resources, how we ensure energy security, and how we cooperate on climate change.

Taxing resources

In recent months, calls to raise taxes on Australia’s LNG exports have grown louder. A number of proposals have been made to secure a greater share of income from Australia’s domestic gas resources, including a “windfall tax” on gas exports.

With limited energy reserves of its own, Japan has been a major driver in the growth of Australia’s liquefied natural gas industry. And it has been blunt in its opposition to calls for new taxes. Japanese Ambassador Kazuhiro Suzuki said any imposition of a windfall tax would be regarded by Tokyo as a “bad surprise” that could deter future investment.

Energy security

Energy security is a second link between the two countries.

Australia’s reserves of oil and oil products are limited. In responding to the current crisis Australian leaders, including Prime Minister Albanese, have visited several Asian nations in an attempt to shore up our supplies.

In contrast, Japan holds 142 days of oil and oil products in addition to private inventories. Japan could help Australia manage any risk of fuel shortages by providing supply commitments.

But the role of energy security in the Australia-Japan relationship is more complicated than guaranteeing fuel supplies.

Japanese officials have expressed concern, for example, about Australia’s incoming domestic gas reservation policy, whereby east coast LNG exporters will be required to hold back 20% of new production for the domestic market from 2027.

Japan has also expressed concern about Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism, a carbon-pricing scheme that places caps on Australia’s greenhouse gas emitting facilities.

The Albanese government has increased the stringency of the Safeguard Mechanism as a way to meet Australia’s climate commitments. Crucially, it covers existing and new gas production, linking Australia’s domestic emissions reduction policies with fossil fuel exports. The review of the Safeguard Mechanism during 2026-27 is sure to draw renewed attention from Japan and elsewhere.

Climate change

Climate change is the third – and perhaps most important – issue linking Australia and Japan. Both countries have committed to achieving net zero emissions by 2050. But there’s uncertainty about the technology mix they will use to get there, including the residual role for gas.

For both Australia and Japan, rapid electrification of transport, heating and other sectors are key, alongside the shift to renewables and storage for power.

Japan’s most recent medium-term energy strategy positions gas as less environmentally damaging than coal as the country moves towards net zero emissions. Japan proposes gradually reducing greenhouse emissions from gas generation through the use of technologies such as mixing hydrogen with gas to generate electricity, and storing carbon dioxide underground, including in Australia. But there is scepticism within Japan about the costs and feasibility of this approach to decarbonisation.

Where to now?

Japan and Australia’s joint declaration is a strong signal both governments want to deepen ties, including in critical minerals and energy.

It is a welcome step forward. There is a large shared agenda between the two countries. Japan’s Green Transformation, a suite of green industrial policies, and Australia’s Future Made in Australia initiative, overlap across green metals, hydrogen and ammonia, low-carbon liquid fuels, critical minerals, renewable technology manufacturing and other areas.

So how to build on the opportunity from here?

Australia’s Climate Change Authority offers a useful way forward, proposing bilateral Decarbonisation Deals as a way of coordinating emissions reduction, trade, investment and industrial policy.

Australia and Japan could develop a roadmap for a shared decarbonisation agenda through a bilateral energy transition council, with industry as delivery partner, and informed by research.

Australia and Japan’s joint agreement offers an opportunity to create a new energy partnership, based on our shared commitment to reaching net zero by mid-century, and our interests in open trade and investment.

The Conversation

Llewelyn Hughes is non-executive director at the Australia-Japan Innovation Fund (AJIF), member of the Clean Energy Transition Subcommittee of the Australia Japan Business Co-operation Committee (AJBCC), and Australia Focal Point for the Energy Research Institute Network of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). He also currently serves as a Lead Author for the 7th Assessment Cycle of the United Nations IPCC WGIII: Mitigation of Climate Change.

Cyclone Gabrielle exposed the risks of forestry slash. New research suggests little has changed

Cyclone Gabrielle exposed the risks of forestry slash. New research suggests little has changed

Alan Gibson/Getty Images

When Cyclone Gabrielle tore through New Zealand’s Tair?whiti region in 2023, it left behind more than silt and floodwaters.

Rivers were choked with forestry debris, beaches littered with logs, and homes, bridges and farmland buried under tonnes of forestry slash swept down from hillsides.

The scale of the impacts – to infrastructure, livelihoods, ecosystems and to M?ori kaitiakitanga (guardianship), and the loss of life – triggered widespread public outrage, with a ministerial inquiry launched soon after.

This led to new rules requiring foresters to better manage harvest debris on steep slopes and reduce the risk of slash being swept away in floods.

Now, the rulebook is being rewritten again, with the government proposing changes to the National Environmental Standards for Commercial Forestry (NES-CF).

This would allow foresters to leave more slash in areas considered lower risk.

Detailed government guidance on managing slash risk is still being developed, in a process which will limit opportunity for public input. At the same time, the reforms curtail councils’ ability to impose tougher restrictions to address the risks of slash.

This all points to an obvious question: have Gabrielle’s lessons for forestry management been learned? Our newly published research suggests that, even before these latest policy changes, they have not.

Little evidence of clear-cut limits

When the ministerial inquiry’s findings were released in May 2023, large clear-cutting – felling all trees in one area at once – was singled out as being a key driver of damage from slash and erosion.

The inquiry recommended limits of 40 hectares per harvest, a five-year “green-up” period between neighbouring sites and no more than 5% of a catchment harvested each year.

The then Labour-led government agreed to these measures, tasking officials to work with Gisborne District Council to review existing resource consents and hasten changes to strengthen the Tair?whiti Resource Management Plan.

However, no change was made to the NES-CF itself to reduce the size of clear-cutting. It was instead left to regional councils to make more stringent rules to protect downstream communities.

To understand how the inquiry recommendations were implemented in Tair?whiti, we obtained all Resource Management Act (RMA) consent applications for forestry harvesting, along with council decision documents, from the time of the inquiry through to July 2025.

This period ended just before the coalition government halted most council plan changes in August 2025, ahead of its planned RMA reforms.

In particular, we examined whether forestry operations and council decisions were actively limiting clear-cut size.

This was important as large, contiguous harvested areas – which can span hundreds or even thousands of hectares – are especially prone to erosion and landslides. The risk is highest during the “window of vulnerability” – or the period after mature trees are removed but before new seedlings can stabilise the soil.

Forestry slash and debris, pictured around the Tairawhiti region following large storms since 2018. Gisborne District Council, CC BY-NC-ND

This was illustrated when scientists mapped more than 116,000 landslides after Cyclone Gabrielle. They found that steep slopes harvested three to five years earlier experienced significantly more landsliding than other forested areas.

Of the six consent applications and decisions we analysed, only one partially limited the harvest area – and that was because it formed part of a water supply catchment. The remaining five imposed no explicit restrictions and did not require neighbouring areas to green up before harvesting continued.

We also examined whether particularly high-risk areas, such as headwater basins and gully systems, were being excluded from harvesting.

These areas are especially vulnerable, as rainfall funnels into gully systems where many landslides begin. Slash left there can become a hazardous mass of debris during heavy rain.

In Washington State in the United States, such areas have long been recognised as requiring specialist geotechnical oversight and are often excluded from harvesting to maintain slope stability.

In contrast, none of the consent documents we reviewed excluded these high-risk areas in Tair?whiti, from ridge tops down to riverbanks.

Under current national standards, slash can still be left in these zones if it’s deemed by foresters to be unsafe or impractical to remove.

Why the risk remains

Our findings may provide context for why Gisborne District Council raised concerns about slash volumes and locations in many catchments after an aerial survey in late 2024. The potential for future risks clearly remains a concern.

An excavator clears away forestry waste from a bridge in Gisborne in February 2023, shortly after Cyclone Gabrielle passed through the region and caused widespread damage. Phil Yeo / Getty Images

The council is now seeking an exemption from the government moratorium on council plan changes, allowing it to introduce stricter regulations for steep land areas.

At the same time, the government has declined to fund a transition away from clear-felling in highly erosion-prone areas, leaving the council to regulate on a case-by-case consent basis rather than through a strengthened regional plan.

Changes to the NES-CF have also limited councils’ ability to set stricter protections for freshwater ecosystems, except in the most severely erodible soils.

These are so narrowly defined, that most of the country are excluded from tougher rules to protect freshwater ecosystems from damaging sediment loads after rain.

This also raises questions about whether these changes will reduce the national risk of slash-laden debris flows, as foresters may still clear-fell steep gullies without limits on harvest size.

New Zealand could choose a different path. This could include amending the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme to address legacy plantings on unstable steep land.

But as it stands, and as climate impacts hit home, regional communities and taxpayers are likely to continue bearing the cost.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Can a sprawling city make public transit work? Sydney may be on the right track

With transport set to be Australia’s top-emitting sector by 2030, officials have recognised the need to invest

At Penrith, a suburb on Sydney’s rural fringe 50km (30 miles) west of the central business district, you can catch a train to the city every four to eight minutes during the morning peak, and roughly every 10 to 15 minutes during off-peak hours before midnight.

On an express service, it takes 52 minutes to Sydney’s Central station, comparable to the journey by car, without factoring in the morning traffic on a tolled motorway.

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